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The governance of immigration has been increasingly discussed, especially in Europe, as a multilevel 
and multi-actor process in which diverse institutional and non-institutional subjects play a role 
(Scholten et al., 2018). In particular the efforts by national governments to achieve more control over 
migration flows involve local governments more directly than in the past (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; 
Oomen and Lenders 2020).   
This trend encompasses a contradiction  in which local policies in Europe have often been considered, 
at least in the last two decades,  more open than national policies, more oriented towards a pragmatic 
reception of immigrants and to the admission to local services also of immigrants with legally dubious 
or irregular status. In the US, “sanctuary cities”, such as New York or San Francisco, have resisted 
federal policies against unauthorized immigration. They have avoided raids and granted some social 
services also to immigrants without legal status (Oomen, Davis and Grigolo, 2016).  In the UK, the 
“City of Sanctuary” movement was established in Sheffield in 2005, and in 2016 it had groups 
operating in more than 80 towns, cities and villages (Bauder, 2017).   While sanctuary movements 
are also crucial sites for defending immigrants against the U.S. Federal government’s policies and 
practices, studies in the U.S. (and in Canada as well) have identified local powers committed to 
combatting irregular immigration with greater determination than federal powers (Chand  and 
Schreckhise,  2014; Varsanyi 2008; Gilbert 2009). In the EU, local policies of exclusion have not 
received much attention in the academic debate, whereas positive aspects of local policies have been 
more often studied (CLIP Network, 2010; Hillmann 2019; Penninx et al., 2004).  An exception is the 
literature on border towns, camps and detention centres in which local authorities are often involved 
(Agier 2008; Mankou 2013; Ferrer-Gallardo and Albet-Mas 2016). Northern Italy, however, has 
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supplied research on local policies of exclusion with many examples (Lebuhn 2013; Mantovan and 
Ostanel, 2015; Semprebon, 2011).  
This article analyses the local governance of asylum from the perspective of a “battleground”. On the 
one hand, it considers the different attitudes of Italian municipalities to asylum seekers, and in 
particular the mobilization of local governments against refugees’ reception. On the other hand,  it 
shows  how civil society actors mobilize in favour of the reception of refugees and immigrants with 
dubious legal status, or against them. It suggests that not only at the national or EU boundaries, but 
also at a local level, a complex “borderwork” (Rumford 2006) occurs. It involves not only public 
powers but also a wide range of other actors: international humanitarian agencies; NGOs and civil 
society organizations; public administrations and local authorities; private citizens and local societies 
(Fontanari and Borri, 2017: 33).  
This “battleground” consequently involves diverse actors. Beyond the idea of a “negotiated order” as 
the result of the interaction among actors (mainly institutional) in the multilevel governance 
framework (Alcantara and Nelles 2014), the management of asylum at a local level is the output of 
conflict and cooperation, of alternative views  and political actions, of official policies and practical 
help, of formal statements and informal practices. On this ‘battleground’, the positions assumed by 
the actors on the asylum and immigration issue are crucial for asserting their cultural and political 
identities, and at the same time in raising awareness and shaping this identity more precisely in 
relation to, and often in contrast with, the positions of other actors. 
Exploring the features of the “battleground” further, the article later focuses in particular on 
“supporters” acting in favour of asylum seekers in various ways, for moral, political or religious 
reasons. I am particularly interested in the political significance of supporting refugees. To recap, the 
practical governance of immigration and asylum is not only determined at an institutional level; it is 
also influenced by this mobilization on the part of civil society.  
The article is structured as follows. The first section briefly describes figures and policies on asylum 
in Italy. The second section explains in more detail how the reception policy works in practice, while 
3 
 
the third section highlights the role of local authorities, and in particular the opposition against the 
establishment of reception centres for asylum seekers. Section 4 instead illustrates the actions 
conducted by various civil society actors in favour of asylum seekers and refugees. Section 5 
discusses the political meaning of these activities. Section 6 presents the conclusions.  
1. Asylum seekers in Italy 
It is first necessary to understand the so-called “refugee crisis” in Italy as a crisis of policies of 
reception, more than a crisis deriving from the numbers of asylum seekers.   
Contrary to what is believed, Italy’s maritime borders were never the main entry points to the country 
for foreign immigrants (Ambrosini 2018). It is true that already in the ’90 and in the ’00, but especially 
from 2011 onwards Italy has become a destination for asylum seekers and other migrants coming 
from the Southern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, in particular through the so-called ‘central 
corridor’ from Libya (Caselli 2019; D’Angelo 2019). In public opinion, the terms ‘immigrants’, 
“landed people” and ‘asylum seekers’ have started to be used interchangeably, and the dominant 
perception has become that of Italy as a country ‘under invasion’ by unwanted immigrants (Bruno 
2016; Dimitriadis 2019). It can be seen as an example of the “gap between evidence and politics” 
(Baldwin-Edwards,  Blitz and  Crawley 2019: 2147). 
As a matter of fact, not only was the number of landings less than imagined, but most of the migrants 
who entered from the sea until 2015 preferred to continue their journey towards Northern Europe by 
crossing the Alps. Thus, the implicit role of Italy was that of a bridge, favouring their passage and not 
strongly enforcing the Dublin III rules on asylum seekers’ identification at the arrival point. Only a 
minority of people landing in Italy claimed asylum in the country, so that there was a gap between 
the number of landings in Italy and that of applications for asylum (Marchetti 2020a).  
In 2015, in reaction to the so-called “migration crisis”, the Italian government was obliged by the EU 
partners, through the European Agenda on Migration, to set up so-called “hotspots” on Italian territory 
and also to ensure that the identification of  asylum seekers was secured instantly (by taking 
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fingerprints for example) (Ansems de Vries and Guild 2019). The European  Agenda on Migration 
of 2015 (European Commission 2015) also envisaged the resettlement of asylum seekers in other 
countries, fixing precise national quotas. The national governments of other EU countries, however, 
explicitly or implicitly, rejected enforcement of that agreement, or its application was slowed down. 
Only about 13,000 asylum seekers were relocated, and in the end the project was abandoned, 
highlighting the difficulties of managing the issue of asylum in democratic states (Sciortino 2019). 
From a (mainly) transit country, Italy was transformed into a (mainly) destination country for asylum 
seekers. It has become the responsible of their reception and, in case, social integration. 
Consequently, the rate of applications for asylum in Italy on the total number of landings has rapidly 
increased. It rose from 37 per cent in 2014 to 56 per cent in 2015, to 68 per cent in 2016. In 2017, it 
surpassed 100 per cent, because of arrivals by land across North-Eastern borders and rejections of 
people to Italy as the first country of arrival, in accordance with the Dublin conventions.  
Thereafter, the number of asylum seekers hosted in Italy grew until July 2017 (Fig. 1): 340,323 
between 2015 and 2017, compared to 241,752 in the previous decade (2005-2014) (Marchetti 2020b).  
In response to this challenge, the government (centre-left coalition, headed by Gentiloni, with Minniti 
Minister of Home Affairs) signed in February 2017 a Memorandum of Agreement with the Libyan 
government and local forces, which came into force in July, and began to hinder the operations of 
search and rescue by NGO ships. The consequence was a sharp reduction of new inflows from the 
Libyan coasts. Most asylum seekers were blocked or intercepted by the Libyan navy and held in 
detention centres, where there was a stark absence of international control: a point already raised 
some years ago by Gammeltoft-Hansen T. and N. Nyberg Sørensen (2013). 
At the end of 2017, the number of asylum seekers dropped to 119,310 (Fig.1). In 2018 the first Conte 
government (Five Stars Movement and League1, with Salvini, League, minister of Home Affairs) 
                                                          
1 The League (in Italian: Lega, previously “Lega Nord”, i.e. “Northern League”) was the winner of the last elections for 
the European Parliament in Italy (May 2019). It takes an open anti-immigrants and anti-refugees stance. In the past it 
asserted the reasons of the (richer) Northern Italian regions against the central government and the (poorer) Southern 
regions. But in recent years it has changed its name (from Lega Nord to Lega) and assumed a nationalistic attitude, taking 
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from the outset adopted a hostile attitude towards asylum seekers, immigrants, and NGOs rescuing 
people in the Mediterranean. Accordingly, the number of people arriving by sea dropped dramatically 
in 2018: 23,370, less than in Spain or Greece. 
 
(figure 1 here) 
 
A crucial point of the new approach was the approval, on 1 December 2018, of law no.132/2018 by 
the first Conte government: this law modified the reception system in a more restrictive direction. 
According to this law, reception centres2 should furnish asylum seekers with just “bed, bath and 
bread”, while the other services (such as legal help, psychological and medical assistance, Italian 
lessons, and orientation to the labour market) are no longer funded. 
 
2. The reception policy 
 
In theory, the pillar of the reception policy until December 2018 was the SPRAR system, established 
in 2003 and renamed SIPROIMI at the end of 2018: a response to asylum based on the cooperation 
between the national government and local authorities, which are required to apply to manage a 
reception facility. The latter hosts in principle a small number of asylum seekers, providing various 
services in cooperation with the third sector: not only bed, bath and bread, but also Italian language 
courses, orientation to the local labour market and to public services, health care,  and socialization. 
As Marchetti (2020b) explains, a central feature of the SPRAR system is the direct involvement of 
the municipalities as leading actors: even if it has often turned out to be more formal than substantial, 
                                                          
inspiration by the French Front National. It achieved good electoral results in local elections also in Central and Southern 
Italy.  
 
2 For the main features of the Italian reception system, and in particular for the distinction between SPRAR (the best 
option) and CAS (the emergency solution), see the following section. 
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the necessary participation of the local authorities means that no SPRAR project can be established 
against the municipalities’ will. 
The resistance by local authorities, however, and the consequent shortage of applications, has led to 
a lack of reception facilities, and a concentration in Southern regions. Only 35,650 places were 
provided (January 2019), since only 1,825  municipalities out of more than 8,000 had agreed to take 
part in the system.3 Furthermore, almost half of the places were located in Southern regions and 
Latium, where local authorities more clearly perceived the benefits of hosting asylum seekers, in 
terms of job creation and stimulus for the area’s economic system. The richer regions, in which the 
possibility of refugees’ employment should in theory be higher, were less willing to cooperate. As a 
consequence, only refugees who had received legal protection (but not all of them), unaccompanied 
minors, families, and frail people have been hosted in the SPRAR system. Now this possibility has 
been further restricted, as a consequence of the Security Package of 2018.  
The government responded to this lack of reception facilities by creating a parallel system based on 
the Centres of Extraordinary Reception (CAS): an emergency response to a recurrent structural 
problem. Indeed, the huge majority of asylum seekers have been hosted in the CAS: 76 per cent at 
the end of 2017 (Campesi 2018, 494). In this case, the national authorities by-pass local governments 
by assigning to private actors (mainly, but not only, NGOs: also hotel owners and other conventional 
employers) the task of establishing and managing various kinds of reception facilities: often large, 
with large numbers of guests (sometimes, more than 100), and with uneven levels of professional 
competence, experience in and commitment to the integration of hosted people, relations with the 
local area and its services (Campesi 2018; Oxfam Italia 2017;  Pinelli 2015). In some cases, the 
infiltration by criminal organizations has been identified, while in others unscrupulous providers have 
been detected, discrediting the whole system of reception. The number of asylum seekers hosted in 
reception facilities was 138,858 at the end of 2018.  
                                                          
3 https://www.sprar.it/i-numeri-dello-sprar, accessed on 20 December 2018.  
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3. The role of local governments in the “battleground” of asylum 
The new national policy reflects also what has happened at the local level from 2014 to 2017. We can 
distinguish different configurations of relations between national and local powers, and of public and 
non-public actors (Campomori and Ambrosini, 2020). Among them of particular importance is the 
opposition against the establishment of facilities for the reception of asylum seekers by local 
authorities.  
My analysis of this issue is based on a press review of online local news. I searched the news items 
on the internet (years 2014-2018) using certain key-words: ‘municipality’; ‘rejection’; ‘asylum 
seekers’; ‘reception centre’. I conducted a content analysis on 70 articles, from twenty national and 
local newspapers, and I selected the most relevant cases in various regions, paying attention to the 
reasons given to refuse, the forms of protest, the involvement of residents, and the final results. My 
purpose was not to draw a complete map of the local opposition against the reception centres, but 
rather to highlight the main drivers of these local policies of exclusion. I define “policies of exclusion” 
as those measures, adopted by local authorities, which aim to ostracize migrants, to separate them, in 
term of rights, from the citizen component of the population by establishing specific prohibitions 
against them, and which set up special screening procedures or limit their access to benefits and local 
social policy resources. These policies form the boundaries of  what is perceived by citizens as the 
legitimate local community, reinforcing a duality between the rightful members (the insiders, 
coinciding with those who identify as ethnically Italian) and outsiders, whose right to residence tends 
to be redefined in more limited and conditional forms. They reassure  citizens about the priority of 
their status compared to that of outsiders, and send out the message that they are being actively 
defended against the “invasion” of their urban space, which they feel to be threatened (Ambrosini 
2013). 
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“Local policies of exclusion” are particularly significant because they can be defined as 
“institutionalized forms of intolerance”: they are drawn up and enforced by municipalities, which are 
elected democratically, and which influence social life within the local communities. I also argue that 
since 2014 these policies have been redirected especially against asylum seekers. 
Many local governments, after having rejected the invitation to manage a SPRAR project, have 
protested against and tried to resist the settlement of refugees on their territory through  CAS centres, 
when the Prefects identify a suitable facility, or when a private organization responds to the public 
tenders for the management of such centres (Marchetti 2020b). 
The opposition openly targets asylum seekers, and the public policies of reception, even if it often 
fosters a confusion between refugees and other immigrants. Local authorities put asylum seekers 
together with other foreign residents, most of whom became settled many years ago. For instance, 
mayors often claim that they already host a huge number of immigrants on their territory, and they 
cannot afford to receive other Third Country nationals. 
The policy of reception through CAS centres, furthermore, favours a framing of local policies of 
exclusion in which mayors and municipalities protest against the imposition of refugees by national 
powers on local communities. A frame of contrast between overbearing central powers and peaceful 
local communities, which are obliged to host unknown and dangerous aliens, is recurrent.   
Connected to this is the victim complex: in explaining their reasons, local authorities often have 
presented themselves as the “victims” of an “invasion”.  This frame permits the political construction 
of an opposition between “us”, the peaceful and integrated local community, and “them”, the “aliens”, 
who are the bearers of danger, insecurity and the diminishment of welfare resources. In addition, this 
view promotes the idea that “we” are under attack and have the right to defend ourselves, our families, 
our homes and our properties (Ambrosini 2018; Lunaria 2017; Marchetti 2020b).  
Historically, this kind of victim complex has triggered the persecution of ethnic and religious 
minorities:  the majority feels itself threated by the presence of aliens, and it depicts its reaction and 
even the recourse to violence as a legitimate defence against this deadly danger. 
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In addition, the local territory is conceived as a private property, or an extension of home. A famous 
slogan of the (Northern) League against immigrants declares “Masters in our own home”. 
An important aspect is that the protests have involved many regions and municipalities, and not only 
the Northern regions of Italy, where the anti-immigrant party (Northern) League has its strongholds, 
as occurred in the past with previous waves of local policies of exclusion. As a consequence, more 
than in the past, also municipalities ruled by centre-left coalitions were involved.  
It can be added that, by establishing a sharp dichotomy between “us” and “them”, local authorities 
and their supporters in some way recreate a meaning of community, reinforcing the bonds between 
local residents who feel and share a common threat. They find an explanation of, and an actor 
responsible for, their problems: their impoverishment or economic decline, feelings of insecurity, 
lack of prospects, are connected to the arrival of these unknown aliens. Paradoxically, fragmented 
local communities experience a new sense of unity in protesting against the settlement of a few 
asylum seekers. 
The opposition of local authorities against asylum seekers can take different forms (Marchetti, 
2020a). The first consists in public declarations and protests, sometimes supported by the collection 
of signatures among local residents.  The fact that the establishment of a  CAS for asylum seekers is 
decided by national authorities, the Prefects, representatives of the State,  is a frequent reason for 
protest: “I do not consider correct the fact that I, the mayor, do not know who these people are, who 
manages them, and where they will be hosted. It is indeed not right that I am surprised at the last 
minute.” (Mayor of Torre Boldone, province of Bergamo, March 2016). It is noteworthy that this 
conflict regarded eight people. Furthermore, the mayor criticized also the private owners who rented 
out their properties to host asylum seekers.4   
The second form of opposition consists of demonstrations and other actions in the streets, with the 
participation of local authorities. In July 2017 a group of mayors in Sicily, near Messina, organized 
                                                          
4 http://www.bergamonews.it/2016/03/08/otto-profughi-arrivo-torre-boldone-sindaco-mincateno/217816/ 
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a protest against the settlement of 50 asylum seekers in a hotel: they blocked the road and prevented 
the passage of a generator necessary to provide electricity for the hotel.  They then organised a 
“permanent escort” in front of the hotel5. 
The third form of opposition concerns official acts (ordinances, decisions of the city council), in order 
to block the establishment of reception centres.  Some examples follow. In Saronno, Lombardy, a 
town with 40,000 inhabitants, in October 2016 the mayor (League) managed to block the opening of 
a reception centre for 32 asylum seekers. The property (a former school) belonged to a congregation 
of nuns and had been restructured with significant expenditure by the catholic organization Caritas 
Ambrosiana, following a request by the Prefect. The mayor employed legal impediments to block the 
transformation of the school into a reception centre, but his motivations were made clear by his 
declarations: “The citizens of Saronno do not want illegal immigrants, and national sovereignty 
belongs to the citizens of Saronno, not to the refugees (…)”6. In another interview, he declared: “I do 
not want African males in proximity to schools attended by our girls”.7 
A radicalization of the fight against the establishment of reception centres for asylum seekers was 
expressed also by the resolution adopted in August 2017 by the mayor (League) of San Germano 
Vercellese, a small town in Piedmont. The resolution obtained wide coverage in the national press 
and in the political debate. The title of the resolution written by the mayoress and adopted by the 
municipal council was “Protection of the territory against invasion/immigration by populations 
coming from Africa and not only”8. She threatened with fines (from 150 to 5,000 euros) people who 
rented out properties to host asylum seekers, including non-profit and religious organizations.9  
                                                          
5 https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/migranti-sale-protesta-sindaci-nebrodi 
6https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/10/01/migranti-sindaco-leghista-blocca-il-centro-accoglienza-delle-suore-ma-
non-ha-fatto-i-conti-con-il-viminale/3067047/. Accessed on 29 December 2018. 
7 https://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/02/23/news/clandestini_lega_condanna_discriminazione_profughi-
158956059/. Accessed on 29 December 2018. 
8 http://www.vita.it/it/article/2017/08/29/la-delibera-del-comune-che-si-tutela-dallinvasione-delle-popolazioni-
a/144335/ . Accessed on 5 January 2019. 
9 http://www.vita.it/it/article/2017/08/29/la-delibera-del-comune-che-si-tutela-dallinvasione-delle-popolazioni-
a/144335/ . Accessed on 5 January 2019. 
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Local authorities issued an official act also in Ventimiglia, a key transit point on the border with 
France. Here hundreds of asylum seekers arrived, especially between 2014 and 2017, after having 
landed in Southern Italy with the purpose of crossing the border and applying for asylum in France. 
French authorities enforced the border, and asylum seekers were blocked. ‘No borders’ movements 
and other activists came to support them, providing tents and some food: an informal camp grew, a 
situation similar to other border zones, such as the so-called Jungle of Calais (Sandri 2018). After 
some months, the residents began to protest, and in August 2016, in the peak period of the tourist 
season, the local mayor (Democratic Party, centre-left) issued an ordinance forbidding the distribution 
of food outside the Red Cross camp or the Caritas facilities.10  The ordinance was issued or alleged 
hygienic reasons, but its meaning became clear when the public fountains near the train station were 
closed: the local authorities wanted to send away asylum seekers.  Some activists were fined for 
having infringed the ban. This disposition lasted some months, provoking many protests, by Amnesty 
International, MSF, Caritas, among others. A public demonstration in Ventimiglia was announced.  
At that point, in April 2017 the mayor withdrew the ordinance.11 
A fourth form of local opposition regards (apparent) spontaneous mobilizations by inhabitants, 
against asylum seekers. It occurred more rarely. A relevant case is that of Gorino, a hamlet with about 
600 inhabitants in the province of Ferrara (region of Emilia-Romagna), with a long-standing leftist 
tradition. Here in October 2016 about one hundred residents blocked with barricades the three 
accesses to the hamlet, protesting against the settlement of 12 refugee women with eight children in 
a local hostel, in which five rooms had been requisitioned by the Prefect. The coach with the women 
was forced to go back, the Prefect had to change his decision, and the refugees were hosted in other 
facilities of the province. The political parties were apparently not involved at the beginning, but 
immediately afterwards the right wing supported the protest. The local secretary of the League spoke 
                                                          
10 http://www.ansa.it/liguria/notizie/2016/08/12/ventimiglia-stop-a-cibo-non-autorizzato_1f8c7a35-78fa-435d-8ce1-
b4fc1dfdb2a7.html. Accessed on 5 January 2019. 
11https://genova.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/04/23/news/ventimiglia_revocato_il_divieto_di_distribuire_cibo_ai_migran
ti-163684319/. Accessed on 5 January 2019. 
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of “new heroes of the Resistance against the dictatorship of reception”, while the mayor (Democratic 
Party) expressed understanding for “the fear of citizens”12. At the general elections of March 2018, 
the League achieved locally 43 per cent of votes in the Lower Chamber, the centre-right as a whole 
68 per cent.13 
A fifth case comprises mobilizations openly organized or supported by far-right movements. As in 
other countries, the issue of asylum has been the opportunity for the radical right to find a new 
political space, to reach a larger public and to acquire new supporters (Castelli Gattinara 2017; as 
regards Germany, Bulli 2017). In Italy, an example is provided by Spinetoli, a small town in the 
region of Marche, with a leftist tradition. Here the mayor (Democratic Party, centre-left) in November 
2017 demonstrated together with the League and CasaPound (a far-right movement explicitly 
connected to the Fascist heritage) against the establishment of a CAS centre, hosting 37 people. The 
mayor called them “an enormous number”14. About 300 people took part in a torchlight 
demonstration. Then CasaPound, however, distanced itself from the mayor, leaving the hall during 
his speech. Before the arrival of the asylum seekers, the house in which they would have resided was 
set on fire. The police never found the perpetrators of the crime. 
In these conflicts, there are also local actors who dissent. In Saronno a network of associations, 
“Quattro passi di pace” (“Four steps of peace”) mobilized in favour of the reception centre, but 
without achieving the purpose of changing the mind of the local administration. What they obtained 
was a verdict against the League (fined with 10,000 euros, as well as 4,000 euros of legal expenses) 
for having described as “clandestine” the 32 asylum seekers to be hosted, in posters that they exposed 
in the town.15 
                                                          
12 http://temi.repubblica.it/micromega-online/le-barricate-caserecce-di-gorino-e-gli-imprenditori-politici-del-razzismo/ . 
Accessed on 5 January 2019. 
13 https://www.ilrestodelcarlino.it/ferrara/politica/elezioni-4-marzo-risultati-gorino-1.3769292. Accessed on 5 January 
2019. 
14 http://www.osservatoriorepressione.info/spinetoli-ap-sindaco-pd-sfila-casapound-linvasione-37-profughi/. Accessed 
on 10 January 2019 
15 https://milano.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/17_febbraio_23/lega-condannata-discriminazione-profughi-non-sono-
clandestini-949736fa-f9b1-11e6-9b43-a08eac6546a0.shtml. Accessed on 29 December 2019. 
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Another relevant case occurred in Verona. Here a network (“Verona che dialoga”, “Dialoguing 
Verona”), in which about 100 local associations take part, mobilized (July 2017) against the protest 
enacted by an anti-immigrant movement (“Verona ai Veronesi” “Verona to its citizens”). For many 
days, the protesters surrounded a reception centre in which 25 asylum seekers were hosted. They 
insulted and intimidated refugees and social workers, and they damaged property. Pro-immigrant 
associations reacted also by threatening to boycott the products of a firm that supported the protest, 
giving its ground to the besiegers.16  
 
 
4. On the other side of the “battleground”: civil society and asylum seekers 
 
Local policies against asylum seekers are a case in point in a wider cartography of relations between 
municipalities and civil society organizations in Italy on this issue. There are also experiences of 
cooperation, especially when local authorities accept to manage a SPRAR project, in agreement with 
local NGOs. Another possibility is tolerance, when local authorities silently accept that civil society 
actors supply services (food, health care, language lessons, accommodation) also to people who are 
not taken in charge by the public institutions, whatever their legal status. Here, the role of the Catholic 
Church, of its institutions (for instance religious orders), services, associations, and  voluntary groups 
is often of particular importance (Ambrosini 2016). The small protestant church is also very active in 
this field.  Sometimes, activism by welcoming local authorities has had to face the opposition of anti-
immigrant actors, especially right-wing parties, with the League at the forefront, and far right 
movements. Of special interest for this article, however, is the case in which local policies of 
exclusion are contested by active civil societies (Campomori and Ambrosini, 2020). 
                                                          
16 http://www.radiopopolareverona.com/old/?q=content/fermare-subito-la-violenza-razzista 
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As in the examples cited above, in the battleground of asylum many actors   from civil society 
mobilized, trying in various ways to combat xenophobic claims and policies of exclusion. Their 
activities range from the cultural level (public events, artistic and cultural activities) to inspire a 
different image of asylum seekers and immigrants, to political activism: some important 
demonstrations have taken place in large Italian cities, especially Milan in May 2017 and in March 
2019. 
But a crucial activity is the delivery of services. These services are both professional, as in the most 
contentious case of Search and Rescue in the Mediterranean, and consist in the grass-roots provision 
of many kinds of support: language courses, basic health services, clothing, food, and shelters for the 
homeless (homelessness is a condition which afflicts many rejected asylum seekers, but also 
recognized refugees).  These services may be furnished by volunteers and are often funded by private 
donations along with support from other social institutions. Overall, these activities provide what 
Leerkes (2016) calls “secondary poor relief” and Montagna (2006) and Belloni (2016) describe more 
positively as “welfare from below”. Another type of service is the delivery of moral support by some 
civil society actors, particularly faith groups (Bloch, Simona and Zetter 2014: 110).   
These actors have very different identities. They range from social movements with radical stances 
to religious institutions, comprising trade-unions and professional associations (lawyers, doctors, 
journalists), NGOs and social cooperatives. We can grasp the different profiles of these actors by 
distinguishing four main categories.  
(1) NGOs, and more widely Third Sector Organizations (TSOs), which provide services to migrants 
and asylum seekers mainly in professional ways, and often in agreement with public bodies. This is 
the case of SPRARs and CASs, which are normally managed by TSOs receiving government funds. 
But in other cases, as in the recent dispute on NGOs saving lives in the Mediterranean Sea, they can 
act against the will of governments. Also these NGOs have a local impact, as they disembark rescued 
people in several maritime towns of Southern Italy. 
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(2) Other organised actors, including trade unions, churches and associations, which often combine 
practical support with political and cultural pressure. They employ professionals but also volunteers, 
can cooperate with public powers but also act beyond the laws, for instance by providing help to 
people with a dubious or irregular legal status (for a parallel to the US: Hagan, 2008) 
(3) Social movements, which place the defence of immigrant rights alongside other battles against 
the state and the capitalist system, but now increasingly provide also concrete services to migrants 
and asylum seekers. Zamponi (2017) has termed them “direct social actions”: “actions that do not 
primarily focus upon claiming something from the state or other power-holders but that instead focus 
upon directly transforming some specific aspects of society by means of the action itself” (Zamponi, 
2017: 97).    
(4) Support groups that spontaneously coalesce, especially around refugees settled in particular 
localities (Ellermann, 2006; Fontanari, 2017), for instance by providing help for people in transit at 
the railway station of Milan (Sinatti 2019), or in the border zone of Ventimiglia-Val Roja (Giliberti 
2017). The German experience of the “summer of welcome” also showed a strong mobilization by 
private citizens, often without any associative label, or political or religious affiliation (Fleischmann 
2017). Karakayali (2017) highlighted the role of “emotions” in mobilizing a relevant proportion of 
German citizens in favour of refugees: according to his estimates, based on several surveys, between 
10 to 20 percent of the German adult population (ibid: 8).  
This category of spontaneous and informal volunteers also comprises individuals who provide 
specific assistance with food, money and accommodation (Fontanari and Ambrosini 2018), or 
language lessons, integrating those provided by law in reception centres. 
The rationale for this classification consists in the degree of organization: the first category (NGOs) 
refers to the most formal and organized actors, endowed with a professional staff. The second 
category (other CSOs organizations) includes various types of actors, with different levels of 
structuration, which mainly provide services to asylum seekers and other migrants.  The third 
category, social movements, by definition does not employ a professional staff: social movements 
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depend on militants and cannot be confused with NGOs. Finally, spontaneous volunteers are the most 
informal actors. 
As regards the beneficiaries, asylum seekers and refugees have been at the forefront in the last decade. 
In fact, however, for various reasons this group cannot be easily distinguished from migrants without 
a legal status or in a dubious legal condition: there are for instance rejected asylum seekers, others 
who were rejected at the first evaluation, but are appealing against the decision, migrants who left 
reception centres or were expelled from them. With the exception of NGOs receiving public funds, 
the other actors normally do not discriminate between asylum seekers and other migrants, and are 
often more committed to people who are not eligible for public services. 
The relations between supporters (pro-immigrant actors) and beneficiaries (asylum seekers and 
immigrants with irregular or dubious legal status) are generally amicable, but some problems can 
arise. A first typical issue is the social and cultural asymmetry: supporters have more command of 
the language, better knowledge of the receiving society, closer connections with other relevant actors 
at the local level, more legitimation to speak in the public debate. Supporters have the possibility not 
to share information, or to do something without telling. For asylum seekers it is very difficult to go 
against this (Hajer and Ambrosini, forthcoming). In other words, supporters have more power.  
According to Fassin (2012), this asymmetry, and the power to choose who deserves help, reproduces 
a “relation of inequality”. Not always do asylum seekers feel empowered and enabled to speak on 
their own. 
A second issue can be the difference in the agenda between supporters and beneficiaries. Especially 
when the activists are politically committed, they can advance their own objectives and priorities, 
while asylum seekers can cultivate different goals and values: often more mundane ones, to obtain a 
permit, a job, a home, and not to fight to change the society (see Nicholls 2013; Belloni 2016, for a 
case of conflict between Italian activists and asylum seekers in a squatted building in Rome). 
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5. The political meaning of supporting refugees 
A central issue in the analysis of the “battleground” of asylum is the relation between practical 
activities in favour of refugees and political commitment to producing broader changes in the legal 
and institutional framework.  A body of literature has taken a critical stance on voluntary help 
disconnected from a political commitment. Karakayali (2017) has observed that volunteers, while 
portraying refugees as victims deprived of agency, tend to exclude references to the social or political 
context of suffering. In accordance with Fassin (2012), humanitarianism does not necessarily result 
in the claim for fundamental rights. Fassin highlights the role of emotions in fostering active solidarity 
with asylum seekers, while at the same time stating that several volunteers seem to avoid bringing 
questions of global inequality to the fore, and instead focus on issues of integration. Kleres (2017) is 
even more critical, claiming that “the dominant emotional regime has contributed to a relatively 
depoliticized form of civic action in the ‘refugee crisis’”(ibid.: 138). 
On studying the Greek case, Siapera (2019) compares the discourse of small, grassroots refugee 
support groups, which seek to re-politicise the question of refugees, with the (post)humanitarian and 
charity discourses of nongovernmental organisations, as well as the racist and security frames found 
in the mass media and policy discourse.  She distinguishes three different kinds of solidarity, even if 
combined: human solidarity, which seeks to restore the humanity of refugees; social solidarity, which 
seeks to extend full social and civic rights; class or political solidarity, which repositions refugees 
alongside the local victims of neoliberal crisis. 
In this regard, Sinatti (2019) studied the case of support to asylum seekers in transit at Milan Central 
Station. She drew a distinction between minimal humanitarianism which depoliticizes, focuses on 
mere physical needs or bare life and in effect reduces the migrants to this, and enabling 
humanitarianism which extends help from being focused on mere survival to the incorporation of 
human rights, democracy promotion and development. Therewith it questions the focus on only bare 
life and could in this sense be seen as political. 
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In my opinion, “minimal humanitarianism” can now also be considered in some way as political, in 
the first place by its opponents. A new fact, in a polarized debate, is the political relevance of every 
activity in favour of asylum seekers and consequently the growing opposition that such activities have 
to face, not only in Italy. The support to asylum seekers provided by civil society actors assumes a 
political meaning, even when they do not declare a political commitment. Simple actions of help, like 
giving food (not to mention rescuing lives at sea), can be targeted by far right activists, by national 
governments and sometimes by local administrations, as acts of dissent, and loaded with political 
significance.17 Accordingly, supporters of refugees have become more conscious of the symbolic 
meaning of the help they give, also in simple and mundane ways. As Schmid, Evers and Mildenberger 
show in the case of Germany, “what is to be done and changed in the name of ‘good’ and ‘human’ 
attitudes has become highly disputed and therefore an increasingly ‘politicized’ topic” (2019, 168) 
In this vein Sandri (2018) talks of “volunteer humanitarianism” of “grassroots organizations” at the 
so-called Jungle of Calais. She emphasizes the political meaning of this offer of services: “it stands 
as a symbol against the strict and violent policies of migration across Europe” (ibid.: 66). Even if 
these grassroots organisations were not initially motivated by political considerations or connected 
with political activism, but mobilised by humanitarian concerns, they went beyond the “neoliberal 
governance” of borders, contesting States and border regimes. Thus, this form of humanitarianism 
“cannot be interpreted simply as an expression of the neoliberal project.” (ibid.: 76). Furthermore, as 
Zamponi (2017) describes in his discussion of direct social actions, help to asylum seekers can begin 
as apolitical action, yet can over time foster the politicization of the supporters being confronted 
directly with the situation, and become a vehicle for the expression of legitimate political claims since 
supporters gain ‘expertise’ through their experience from the actions. Fleischmann (2017) in turn, in 
her study on help to refugees in Southern Germany, shows how volunteers, while ostensibly defining 
                                                          
17 At the time of writing (beginning of July 2019), the leading item of Italian news was the conflict between the Italian 
government and the young captain of the ship Sea Watch 3, the German Carola Rackete. What she defined as an act of 
humanity was considered by the government a political attack on the national sovereignty. 
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their activity “apolitical”, in fact act at a political level in three ways: as “covert activists”, when they 
strategically avoid revealing the political meaning of their action; as “change agents”, when they try 
to influence the local society by promoting more acceptance of ethnic diversity; as “political 
dissenters”, when they protest  against political decisions hostile to refugees. In sum, “the ‘apolitical’ 
can indeed be highly political”, as “new meanings of political action stem from the manifold acts of 
volunteering for refugees.” (ibid., 55). 
 
6. Conclusions. The local dispute on asylum 
Immigration policies are one of the most controversial issues in the political debate at the national 
and international level. Asylum, in particular since the Arab springs of  2011 has become particularly 
important as the typical case of unwanted migration, and the target of many xenophobic stances. A 
“rhetoric of abuse” is increasingly adopted in its regard (Schuster 2009), a systematic suspicion that 
refugees exploit the humanitarian protection to enter and settle in richer countries, even if 84 per cent 
of international refugees are actually hosted in poorer countries (UNHCR 2019). 
This dispute has a local expression that is particularly relevant in Italy. In general the municipal level 
is crucial for the acceptance and the social “integration” of refugees, but the controversy on the 
reception of asylum seekers has highlighted the horizontal dimension of migration governance. By 
this term (horizontal dimension) I mean an arena in which not only public institutions and political 
actors are involved, but also non-public actors (Scholten et al. 2018), and often ones non-political in 
conventional terms. They engage in the public debate, trying to create a better climate for the 
acceptance of migrants and refugees, but also delivering goods and services to respond to their 
practical needs. I have tried to advance understanding of the pro-refugee civil society by 
distinguishing four type of actors, according to their level of formal organization: NGOs, other civil 
society organizations (churches, trade-unions, associations…), social movements, spontaneous 
mobilizations of common citizens. 
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On the other side, far-right movements and xenophobic claims support policies of exclusion. I placed 
this conflict among diverse actors and views of asylum under the heading of ‘battleground’.  
This article has contributed to the literature on asylum policies in Europe in three ways. The first 
contribution regards the introduction of the concept of “battleground” to frame conflicts and alliances 
on migration and asylum policies between different actors at the local level, where beyond public 
players, political parties and migrants, several civil society actors are involved: a dynamics of the 
horizontal dimension of the multilevel governance of migration. The second aspect concerns the 
discussion of “local policies of exclusion” against immigrants, in terms of how these policies have 
targeted asylum seekers and how at the same time they have been contrasted by pro-immigrant actors. 
The third input refers to a typology of these pro-immigrant actors, structured in four classes, 
namely  NGOs, and more widely Third Sector Organizations (TSOs); other organised actors; social 
movements; support groups that spontaneously coalesce. 
 
Directions for future research should consist primarily in an analysis of urban policies of asylum, 
considering not only “sanctuary cities” or “cities of refuge”, but also cities which reject people in 
need of humanitarian protection. Second, it is necessary to gain better understanding of the mobile 
dynamics of the local “battleground”, and in particular the conflict between alternative views and 
mobilizations. Here more detailed comparison between the EU and North America would be 
instructive. Third, examination of the social and cultural backgrounds of pro-immigrant and anti-
immigrant actors is desirable, together with study of how their practical commitment involves new 
political views, alliances, and other forms of activism.  Fourth, the role of asylum seekers and 
refugees, and of other migrants and their movements, should be considered and compared with those 
of native pro-immigrant actors. If immigration and asylum continue to occupy a central place in the 
political debate, a deeper understanding of the construction of the governance of the issue will become 
even more necessary. 
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